

# Assessment of Healthcare-Associated Infections & Antibiotic Resistance Outbreak Detection Data, Tools, and Barriers





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Council for Outbreak Response: Healthcare-Associated Infections & Antibiotic Resistant Pathogens (CORHA) Website: corha.org

## Background

- The Council for Outbreak Response: Healthcare-Associated Infections (HAI) and Antibiotic Resistant Pathogens (AR) (CORHA) is a multidisciplinary partnership consisting of public health and healthcare organizations charged with developing consistent and coordinated approaches to improve the detection, investigation, response, and prevention of HAI/AR outbreaks.
- Public Health and its healthcare partners share responsibilities for responding to HAI/AR outbreaks. This extends to outbreak detection and reporting. As a general rule, public health agencies prefer to learn about potential outbreaks early. Healthcare partners often serve as the "eyes and ears" that are able to alert public health to HAI/AR events that require their involvement (e.g., novel pathogens; contaminated medical products; other outbreaks).
- The CORHA Outbreak Detection and Reporting Workgroup developed an assessment to better understand how HAI programs at public health departments and healthcare organizations use technology to detect potential HAI/AR outbreaks. Methods
- The assessment was launched in July 2017 and responses were collected electronically using Qualtrics.
- Recipients were asked to: 1) Describe their HAI/AR surveillance data sources and software tools used to detect outbreaks. 2) Describe any barriers they experienced using surveillance system data for outbreak detection.
- All public health jurisdictions received the assessment
- Healthcare partner organizations (SHEA & APIC) shared the assessment with their respective networks via email newsletter.

### Results

## **Work Setting**


# Public Health (N = 96)\*

| Work Setting  | No. (%) |  |  |
|---|---------|--|--|
| State Health Department                                     | 52 (54) |  |  |
| No Response   | 25 (26) |  |  |
| Local Health Department                                     | 13 (14) |  |  |
| Large Local/Urban Health Department                         | 3 (3)   |  |  |
| District/Regional Health Department                         | 2 (2)   |  |  |
| Hybrid State/Local Health Department                        | 1 (1)   |  |  |
| *Limitation: 5 state jurisdictions had multiple respondents |         |  |  |
| Healthcare (N = 95)   |         |  |  |
| Work Setting  | No. (%) |  |  |

| Thealthcare (N = 95)                 |         |
|--------------------------------------|---------|
| Work Setting                         | No. (%) |
| Hospital                             | 47 (49) |
| No Response                          | 25 (26) |
| Critical Access Hospital             | 7 (7)   |
| Behavioral/Psychiatric Facility/Unit | 6 (6)   |
| Long-Term Care Facility              | 2 (2)   |
| Outpatient Facility                  | 2 (2)   |
| Long-Term Acute Care Hospital        | 1 (1)   |
| Other                                | 5 (5)   |
|                                      |         |

## Results

## **Occupation Distribution**



#### Data Sources Used for Outbreak Detection by Public Health and Healthcare

## **III.** Public Health (N = 96)

| Existing Data   | No. (%) |
|---|---------|
| CDSS <sup>†</sup> : CRE, VRE, other <sup>§</sup>            | 26 (20) |
| None  | 20 (15) |
| CDSS: HBV, HCV§   | 19 (15) |
| NHSN <sup>‡</sup> HAIs (CLABSI, CAUTI, SSI, VAE, VAP) §     | 15 (12) |
| PH Laboratory Information Systems                           | 15 (12) |
| NHSN LabID event module (CDI, MRSA, CRE, ESBL, VRE, MSSA) § | 14 (11) |
| Syndromic surveillance data                                 | 14 (11) |
| Other   | 7 (5)   |

**†Communicable Disease Surveillance System (CDSS)** \*National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN)

## Healthcare (N = 95)

| <b>Existing Data</b>                                | No. (%) |
|---|---------|
| Microbiology laboratory data                        | 29 (26) |
| Electronic health record data                       | 22 (20) |
| NHSN HAIs (CLABSI, CAUTI, SSI)                      | 19 (17) |
| NHSN LabID event module (CDI, MRSA, CRE, ESBL, VRE) | 17 (15) |
| Pharmacy data                                       | 10 (9)  |
| Billing/coding data                                 | 5 (5)   |
| NHSN Dialysis event data                            | 2 (2)   |
| Other   | 6 (6)   |

## Software Tools Used by Public Health to Detect Outbreaks

## Public Health (N = 96)\*

| Software Name                                   | No. (%) |
|---|---------|
| None  | 31 (36) |
| Statistical Analysis Software (SAS)             | 19 (22) |
| ESSENCE#  | 10 (12) |
| No Response                                     | 10 (12) |
| SATScan   | 7 (8)   |
| R   | 6 (7)   |
| Communicable Disease Surveillance System (CDSS) | 4 (5)   |
| WHONet  | 3 (3)   |
| Microsoft Excel/Access                          | 3 (3)   |
| National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN)       | 2 (2)   |
| STATA   | 1 (1)   |
| Research Electronic Data Capture (REDCap)       | 1 (1)   |

\*Healthcare reported using software tools such as EPIC (11, 32%), Theradoc (4, 12%), MedMinded (3, 9%), Vigilanz (2, 6%), Other (9, 25%), & None (5, 15%) (N = 34) \*Electronic Surveillance System for the Early Notification of Community based Epidemics (ESSENCE)

# Public Health (N = 96)

| Software Tool Utilization, No.              | SATScan | WHONet | SAS | R | ESSENCE |
|---|---------|--------|-----|---|---------|
| NHSN LabID                                  | 4       | 1      | 8   | 5 | 3       |
| NHSN HAIs                                   | 5       | 1      | 8   | 4 | 4       |
| CDSS: CRE, VRE§                             | 5       | 2      | 12  | 4 | 7       |
| CDSS: HBV, HCV§                             | 4       | 1      | 10  | 4 | 6       |
| Public Health Lab<br>Information<br>Systems | 3       | 0      | 7   | 3 | 3       |
| Syndromic<br>Surveillance data              | 2       | 1      | 6   | 4 | 9       |
| Totals                                      | 7       | 3      | 17  | 5 | 9       |

Not enough resources 13 Not timely enough Access to data, system Lack of expertise Lack ease of use/simplicity Inaccurate/low quality Other

**Barriers to Surveillance** 

## Conclusions

 $\blacksquare$  PH (N = 96)  $\blacksquare$  HC (N = 95)

Unclear case definition

Too many false alarms

Sample bias

- Public health and healthcare organizations have different data sources and tools available for assessing HAI/AR outbreaks, likely reflecting the different goals and access of organizations
- Public health tends to have access to more analytic software but not as many primary data sources
- Of public health respondents, 36% reported no use of software to detect outbreaks
- There is a wide variety of data sources and software tools used to detect healthcare-associated outbreaks among public health agencies and acute care facilities
- There is a need for more resources to support timely detection of HAI/AR outbreak events
- These results highlight data sources and will help improve data sharing & access between public health & healthcare

#### Resources

 CORHA is uniquely positioned to join critical stakeholders and develop guidance documents, tools, and recommendations to improve HAI/AR outbreak detection and response. One example product (available on corha.org) is the CORHA HAI-AR Outbreak and Response Tracking System which can be used by health departments and large healthcare systems to manage information related to investigations of possible HAI-AR outbreaks.

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